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Abstract 
 
Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal, we construct a synthetic index 
(R-index) intending to capture the restrictiveness on market access due to 
product specific rules of origin (PSRO) that apply at the tariff-line 
level. The R-index is constructed for rules of origins under NAFTA and 
under the single list applying to PANEURO, the new regime applying to all 
EU preferential trade agreements. The R-index highlights how identical PSRO 
have different impacts across countries, and how the complexity of PSRO 
varies across sectors. Having controlled for the extent of tariff 
preference at the tariff-line level, the R-index contributes to account for 
differences in utilization rates at the tariff line level. The index is 
then used to assess composition effects across countries subjected to some 
set of PSRO and to compute estimates of the compliance costs associated 
with rules of origin under both regimes.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Notifications of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) to 
the WTO secretariat indicate that all but twelve countries 
(small islands and municipalities except for Mongolia) belong 
to at least one PTA. According to a recent tally (World Bank 
2005, table 2.1), the average number of PTAs per country is 6, 
with 45 developing countries having signed bilateral trading 
arrangements with a Northern partner, and of the 109 North-
South (N-S) PTAs, 90 having been created since 1990.  A hub-
and-spoke trading system is developing in which the partners 
with the largest markets (the EU and the US) sign individual 
(or group) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with a range of 
peripheral countries. Current examples include the ongoing 
negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
and those to be scheduled for a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). At issue is how much market access Southern 
partners will get to the Northern partner. Next to these, 
Northern countries also have in place the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) and more recently the Everything But Arms 
(EBA) and Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) initiatives of 
the EU and US respectively.    
 
Reciprocity (as in the FTAs) or not (as in the GSP and other 
initiatives), these PTAs being less than a Customs Union, 
establishing origin is key to the implementation of the 
agreement, since it is how imports are prevented from entering 
the preferential area through the low-tariff partner, a 
situation that might be highly liberalizing in the absence of 
Rules of Origin (RoO) if partners were to compete for tariff 
revenue (see Richardson, 1995). Neglected until recently, RoO 
are attracting increasing attention, both theoretically and 
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empirically.1 The theoretical literature is slowly leading to a 
consensus on the effects of RoO, several of these going beyond 
the avowed intent of conferring origin.2 The empirical 
literature is more scattered, partly because the necessary 
data on utilization rates of origin are only starting to 
become available, and are also difficult to interpret (see 
below). Because of the complexity of the RoO (both regime-wide 
and product-specific RoO (PSRO) but mostly because of the 
latter), after controlling for the extent of preferential 
access, patterns of utilization rates show a great disparity 
across activities, partners, and PTAs. 
 
This complexity in the patterns of uptake of preferences makes 
it extremely difficult to assess how much market access 
Southern partners are getting from these PTAs. At the same 
time, knowing more about the extent of effective market access 
is of significance for the evolving multilateral trade 
negotiations, since one of the objectives of the Doha Round is 
to provide increased market access for developing countries, 
and LDCs in particular.3   
 
This paper describes and evaluates the PSRO governing the PTAs 
entered by the two leading Northern partners, the EU and the 
US. It draws on utilization rate data on Mexican exports to 
the US in 2001 and similar data for ACP exports to the EU in 
                     
1 Early theoretical contributions include Krueger (1995), Krishna and 
Krueger (1995), and previous efforts at quantification include Herin (1986) 
and Koskinen (1983) for EFTA, Estevadeordal (2000), Carrère and de Melo 
(forthcoming), and Anson et al (forthcoming) for NAFTA. Brenton and Imawaga 
(2004) survey the debate and policy implications of RoO, and Cadot et al. 
eds. (forthcoming) assembles recent contributions. 
2 The main effects are: (i) raising the costs of production; (ii) 
redirecting investment towards the partners to satisfy RoO; (iii) trade 
suppression (i.e. changing trade patterns within the zone to satisfy RoO) 
3 In view of these objectives, it is worth recalling that it is at the 
insistence of industrialized countries that harmonization of RoO was not 
put on the agenda of the current round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
For further discussion, see Brenton and Imagawa (2004). 
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2002.4 More specifically, the paper makes two contributions. 
First, we construct an R-index of restrictiveness of PSRO 
along the lines first proposed by Estevadeordal (2000) in the 
case of NAFTA, modifying it and extending it for the EU 
single-list (SL) set in place under PANEURO. This synthetic R-
index is then used to compare PSRO under NAFTA and PANEURO.  
 
To anticipate our main conclusions, first, we show in the case 
of the PANEURO that the R-index is useful to summarize how 
countries are differently affected by the same set of RoO 
because of their different export baskets to the EU. Second, 
we show that the R-index is a relatively reliable statistic in 
the sense that, subject to caveats, after controlling for the 
extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, it 
accounts for differences in utilization rates at the tariff 
line level. Finally, together with utilization rates, the 
index can be used to estimate total compliance costs of PSRO. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
contrasts PSRO under PANEURO and NAFTA and discusses the 
construction of a restrictiveness index (R-index) at the 
tariff line level. Section 3 then applies this index to 
describe and compare the two regimes for broad product 
categories. Having checked that the R-index is indeed 
correlated with utilization rates after having controlled for 
preference rates, Section 4 uses the distribution of R-index 
values to non-parametric estimates of upper and lower bounds 
                     
4 The implicit assumption here is that the PANEURO and NAFTA regimes will 
survive pretty much unaltered in the negotiations underway for an FTAA and 
for the EPAs. Estevadeordal and Suominen (forthcoming) describe in great 
detail the complexities of RoO across PTAs. Cadot, de Melo and Tumurchudur 
(2005) use the approach in this paper to compare AGOA and EBA ROO for those 
ESA countries. Compared with EBA, AGOA has less product coverage, but 
simpler ROO, since a single criterion of 35% regional value content is used 
to confer origin outside of textiles, while for textiles and apparel (T&A) 
a yarn forward rule which would be the strictest criterion under the 
observation rule adopted in this paper. They conclude that EBA and AGOA 
give similar treatment, except for T&A for non-LDCs where AGOA PSRO are 
stricter. 
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of total compliance costs associated with rules of origin. 
Section 5 concludes. An appendix describes in detail the 
observation rule used to construct the R-index. 
 
2. The NAFTA and PANEURO regimes 
 
Virtually all PTAs have regime-wide Roo and PSRO. We describe 
briefly those rules in the case of NAFTA and PANEURO, starting 
with regime-wide rules. 
 
Regime-wide rules. These usually include: (i) a de minimis (or 
tolerance) criterion which stipulates a maximum percentage of 
non-originating materials that can be used without affecting 
the origin of the final product; (ii) cumulation5; (iii) roll-
up6; (iv) duty-drawback7;(v) certification method. How these 
                     
5 Cumulation allows PTA producers to import non-originating materials from 
other PTA member countries without affecting the final product’s 
originating status. Three types of cumulation rules are distinguished: 
bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation. Bilateral cumulation is most 
common and applies to trade between two partners in a PTA. It stipulates 
that producers in country A can use inputs from country B without affecting 
the final good’s originating status provided that the inputs are themselves 
originating (i.e. provided that they themselves satisfy the area’s ROOs). 
Under diagonal cumulation (the basic principle of the EU’s PANEURO system), 
countries tied by the same PTA can use materials that originate in any 
member country as if the materials were originating in the country where 
the processing is undertaken. Finally, under full cumulation, all stages of 
processing or transformation of a product within the PTA can be counted as 
qualifying content regardless of whether the processing is sufficient to 
confer originating status to the materials themselves. It is easy to show 
that full cumulation allows for greater fragmentation of the production 
process than the more commonly used bilateral and diagonal cumulation, and 
hence is less restrictive. 
6 The absorption or roll-up principle allows non-originating materials 
which have acquired origin by meeting specific processing requirements to 
maintain this origin when used as input in a subsequent transformation. In 
other words, the non-originating materials are no longer taken into account 
in calculating value added. The roll-up or absorption principle is used in 
most PTAs (in particular the EU’s GSP and Cotonou), although a few have 
exceptions for the automotive sector.  
 
7 Duty drawbacks are refunds to exporters of tariffs paid on imported 
intermediate inputs. Many PTAs, especially in the Americas, mandate the 
elimination of duty-drawback schemes for exports to partner countries, on 
the ground that a duty drawback claimed by a producer in A to export to B 
would put that producer at a competitive advantage compared to domestic 
producers in B given that the A-producer already benefits from the 
elimination of intra-bloc tariffs. The elimination of duty drawbacks as 
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regime-wide rules differ between NAFTA and PANEURO is 
described in table 1. 
 
Table 1 here: Regime-Wide RoO in NAFTA and EU’s GSP and 
Cotonou Agreements 
 
Table 1 shows that even for regime-wide rules, there is an 
impression of ‘made-to-measure’, an expression first used by 
Johnson (1965) in describing the complexity of the tariff 
structures in developing countries. The table also shows that 
regime-wide rules differ across PTAs for the same Northern 
partner, confirming the hub-and-spoke characteristic of N-S 
PTAs. Also note the difference in certification methods 
between the EU and US PTAs: in the US PTAs, certification is 
easier to carry out, at least in principle, compared with the 
EU PTAs. 
 
Product-specific RoO (PSRO). Estevadeordal (2000) proposed a 
synthetic index based on an observation rule to summarize the 
restrictiveness of a given PSRO. His ordinal index computed at 
the tariff line level, ranged from one (least restrictive) to 
seven (most restrictive), (i.e. 1 7iR< < ). His observation rule 
was based on the following two assumptions. The first is that 
the restrictiveness of a change of Tariff Classification (CTC)  
can be ranked in terms of its restrictiveness on the basis of 
the following observation: A change of classification at the 
chapter level (CC) has to be more difficult to satisfy than a 
change at the Heading (CH) level; likewise, a change at the 
heading level has to be stricter than at the subheading (CS) 
level, and a change at the subheading level more stringent 
than at the tariff line or item level (CI). This implies that 
                                                                
part of a PTA’s formation can imply a cut in the profitability of final-
good assembly for export to partner countries in the area, although tariff 
escalation, when present, already provides some protection for final-
assembly operations (as it implies lower tariffs on intermediate goods than 
on final ones). 
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the following observation rule (larger values corresponding to 
more restrictiveness): 
 
  CC CH CS CI∆ > ∆ > ∆ > ∆
 
If a CTC is widely used in both NAFTA and PANEURO, in the 
majority of cases, it is almost always accompanied by other 
criteria to be met to confer origin. These include: (i) a 
value content (VC) criterion, widespread in the case of 
PANEURO and varying from 50% to 85% (under NAFTA only three 
values, of 50%, 55% and 60%) of materials having to originate 
in the preferential zone; (ii) technical requirements (TECH); 
exceptions (EXC); (iii) allowances (ALLOW) that relax the 
restrictiveness of obtaining origin, allowances being used 
only for PANEURO. All but allowances make it more difficult to 
satisfy origin, so the observation rule assigns higher values 
to the index resulting from the CTC when these other 
requirements are added on (and a lower value when there is an 
allowance).  
 
Table 2 describes the distribution of the main PSRO at the 
tariff line level for NAFTA and PANEURO. The main difference 
between the two regimes is apparent from the distribution of 
single criteria: for PANEURO, 13% of tariff lines only rely on 
a VC criterion whereas for NAFTA 89% of tariff lines rely on a 
CTC or a single exception.  
 
Insert table 2 here: Distribution of PSRO under NAFTA and 
PANEURO 
 
A synthetic index, like the R-index developed by Estevadeordal 
and subsequently modified by Estevadeordal and Suominen 
(forthcoming) based on the principles described above, is 
arguably a useful way to summarize the complexities of PSRO 
evident from the entries in table 2. In the following, we 
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modify the R-index by taking into account the following 
considerations that apply mostly to the S-L under PANEURO. 
First, allowances are taken into consideration. Second, the 
“wholly-obtained” criterion which applies mostly to 
agricultural products (and is not present in NAFTA) should be 
given a low restrictiveness value since PSRO rarely bind for 
agricultural products. Third, in view of the large differences 
in allowances for the extent of non-originating inputs in 
PANEURO, it is plausible to assign a higher value for VC rules 
that require high values for intermediates originating 
regionally. Finally, we also code two other additional 
requirements under PANEURO and take into account the 
possibility of choice of PRSO given to exporters under the 
PANEURO S-L by assigning the lowest R-index value when 
exporters have a choice among alternative requirements to meet 
origin. When applicable to NAFTA PSRO, we recomputed the R-
index accordingly. Details on the construction of the R-index 
(computed for 3555 tariff lines for NAFTA and 5595 tariff 
lines for PANEURO) are given in the annex.  
 
The resulting ordinal R-index thus assigns a single number 
estimate to the restrictiveness of PSRO that must be 
negotiated to obtain origin. In addition to the inevitable 
arbitrariness involved in setting up the observation rule 
described in the annex, the R-index has other shortcomings. In 
particular, it does not control for the degree of preferences 
and for the characteristics of the different activities: 
satisfying a CTC involving a CH for intermediate activities is 
likely to be easier than if it is to be satisfied for a final 
good activity.  
 
Before applying the R-index to describe the restrictiveness of 
PSRO, we describe its characteristics and, since it was 
constructed independently of tariff preferences, we compare Ri 
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values for both NAFTA and PANEURO regimes with the 
distribution of tariff preferences, where the tariff 
preferences, τi, are also defined at the tariff line level as 
follows:  
 
 
1
pref mfn
i i
i mfn
i
t t
t
τ −= +  (0.1) 
Insert Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Restrictiveness 
Index and preferences 
 
Figure 1 describes the resulting distribution of R-index 
values computed for NAFTA and for PANEURO. The shapes of the 
two distributions are quite similar with the bulk of values in 
the 4 and 5 range. The major difference between the two 
histograms comes from the low index values (Ri=1) assigned to 
“wholly obtained” criterion used for PSRO for agricultural 
products under PANEURO. 
  
Since tariff preferences are usually known when RoO are 
negotiated (preferences being equal to the MFN tariff since 
negotiated N-S PTAs are in effect FTAs except for some 
agricultural products), it is interesting to see whether 
values of the R-index are higher for sectors with tariff peaks 
(and hence lower for sectors with below-average tariffs). 
Table 3 compares average values of Ri and iτ  values, leaving 
out the middle third of the distribution of iτ  from the 
comparison.8
 
                     
8 In these comparisons, and all the following ones, only tariff lines with 
positive exports are considered and outlier observations have been removed. 
In the NAFTA case, 5 observations with  (and u100%iτ > i=100%) were 
eliminated (3 belonging to Chapter 24 - Tobacco and 2 to Chapter 12 - 
Vegetables). In EU case, 88 observations were deleted (accounting for 0.02% 
of total trade to the EU). These are(preference rates in parenthesis): 
mushroom (HS 200310 -150%); garlic (HS 070320-100%); sugar (HS 170111-67%, 
HS170199-70%); tobacco (HS 240310-75%, HS 240399-42%, HS 240220-58%); 
alcohol (HS 220710-47%).    
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For both NAFTA and PANEURO, average R-index values are higher 
for tariff-peak sectors than for low-tariff sectors. That the 
R-index values and tariff preference values follow this 
pattern either confirms that the R-index values corroborate 
what is believed to be an accurate description of the 
restrictiveness of PSRO or, alternatively if one believes that 
the criteria underlying the observation rule are indeed 
accurate on average, then indeed PSRO are more restrictive in 
sectors with high tariff preferences, a result confirmed below 
with regressions at the tariff line level. 
 
Insert table 3 here: PSRO Restrictiveness Index and Protection  
 
The patterns in table 3 suggest that indeed, the political-
economy of RoO-making may well be one in which the negotiation 
power of the Northern partner results in little market access 
to the Southern partner, i.e. leaves them on what Anson et al. 
(forthcoming) call their participation constraint, so that 
negligible extra market access is reaped from preferential 
market access. It would thus seem that for both PANEURO and 
NAFTA, the determination of PSRO is indeed, driven by a 
political-economy process.9  
 
3. Applying the index: Composition effects across sectors and 
countries 
 
Working at the section level (21 sectors), we use the R-index 
to indicate the importance of composition effects across 
countries and across activities for the 77 ACP countries 
benefiting from ACP preferences.10  Figure 2 plots the ROO 
                     
9 See Cadot et al. (forthcoming) for evidence in the case of NAFTA. 
10 In all the computations that follow we restrict our analysis to   request 
for ACP treatment from ACP countries. We do this simply because this is the 
tariff regime requested in the majority number of cases, even though 
tariff-free under GSP (EBA) preferences would have given equal or greater 
market access. This request for sometimes less favorable preferences could 
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index value for the LDC (40 countries) and non-LDC (37 
countries) group of ACP countries.  
 
Insert figure 2 here: ACP average PANEURO R-index: LDCs vs. 
non-LDCs 
 
Figure 2(a) reports simple (i.e. unweighted) figures. 
Departures from the 450 line are thus entirely due to 
aggregation effects, i.e. to the fact that not all product 
categories are exported for each group of countries. Note 
first that the R-index usually takes on higher values down the 
sector classification, i.e. for activities with increasing 
degrees of processing (e.g from live animals (1) to T&A (11). 
Since, roughly speaking, increasing numbers in that 
classification correspond to more round-about techniques of 
production (lower sectoral value-added ratios), it appears 
that PSRO rules become generally more restrictive for sectors 
requiring more processing. In a world of increasing 
verticalization of trade, and in which tariff escalation 
implies that protection (and hence tariff preferences) 
increase with the degree of processing, this pattern suggests 
that final goods producers in Northern countries lobby 
successfully to obtain restrictive PSRO for final goods (while 
at the same time using VC restrictions to prevent Southern 
producers from purchasing intermediates outside the zone). 
Overall, not surprisingly for this large sample of countries, 
composition effects are small since most observations are 
close to the 450 line (observations below the 450 line like 
sector 2 (vegetables) correspond to non-LDC specialization in 
activities with the corresponding Ri values). Thus, as a group, 
                                                                
be explained by slightly different regime-wide rules under both regimes. 
However it is most likely due to learning effects (recall that utilization 
data are for 2002, the first year that EBA was in full effect). Cadot, de 
Melo and Tumurchudur (2005) discuss reasons in the case of East and 
Southern Africa countries. 
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LDC and non-LDC interests appear to be equally affected by 
PSRO, at least at this level of aggregation.  
 
The picture changes dramatically when one moves from the 
product composition to differences in the volume of exports 
within these sector categories. Table 2(b) gives the same 
information, but weighting each Ri value by the corresponding 
trade volume at the product line. Taking footwear and T&A as 
two examples, LDCs exports of footwear are relatively 
concentrated in product categories with stringent PSRO, while 
non-LDCs exports of T&A are concentrated in exports in product 
categories with stringent PSRO. Since the observations below 
the 450 line tend to be concentrated in sectors with high R-
index values, the non-LDCs are relatively penalized. Note also 
that using trade-weights also alters the computed values of 
the Ri values. For instance, weighing by trade volumes cuts 
almost in half the R-index value for T&A for LDCs. 
  
To sum up, figure 2 leads to three observations. First, Ri 
values tend to be higher for activities with greater 
processing (i.e. lower value added). Second, taking into 
account that preferential access is almost identical for LDCs 
and non-LDCs, insofar as trade volumes are indicators of 
countries interests in PSRO, LDCs and non-LDCs would have 
different interests in changes in PSRO rules. For example, the 
LDC [non-LDC] group would be more interested in a relaxation 
of PSRO in footwear [T&A]. Third, non-LDCs face restrictive 
PSRO in the sectors in which they have a revealed comparative 
advantage (in the sense of high export shares). If the R-index 
is an acceptable proxy of the costs of complying with 
establishing origin, as LDCs move up the ladder of comparative 
advantage, they will get less market access under the single-
list PRSO. 
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Next, one may inquire further if North-South PTAs such as 
those entered into by the US and the EU are characterized by 
more restrictive PSRO in sectors with higher preference rates. 
Using trade weights and the same 21 sections as in figure 2, 
figure 3 plots the average restrictiveness value for section 
against the average preference margin.  
 
Insert figure 3 here: Preferences and ROO across EU PTAs 
 
The scatter plot shows a positive correlation between 
preferences and restrictiveness already noted in table 3. This 
is confirmed by the following regressions using all 
observations (section dummies not reported and t-statistics in 
parenthesis)  
 
2
(0.86) (4.14)
0.01 0.005 ; .31 ; 3555US USi iR R Nτ = + = =   
2
(8.26) (8.27)
0.01 0.004 ; .41, 19720EU EUj jR R Nτ = − + = =  
Both set of regressions confirm that the scatter plot pattern 
at the section level carries on at the tariff-line level. For 
both EU FTAs and NAFTA, higher preference rates are associated 
with higher R-index values.11  
 
4. Correlates of utilization rates and non-parametric cost of 
compliance estimates. 
 
As a second application, we use to the distribution of R-index 
values along with utilization rates to derive upper and lower 
bounds of compliance costs associated with rules of origin 
under PANEURO and NAFTA. Before carrying out this exercise, we 
                     
11 Regressions use unweighted values. Using trade weights to compute an 
aggregate rate of protection raises two problems (see e.g. Trefler, 1993). 
First, since trade flows are endogenous, the resulting endogeneity bias 
will understate the extent of protection. Second, tariff lines are not 
equivalent because of domestic product specialization and demand effects. 
So using export weights introduces a bias, but accounts for the relative 
importance of products. Correlations using export weights (not reported 
here), would indicate the relative importance of products. 
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check first the correlation between variations in utilization 
rates and R-index values after having controlled for 
variations in preferences rates and other potential 
determinants of utilization rates. Indeed, if after 
controlling for preference margins, one finds the expected 
negative correlation between utilization rates and R-index 
values, variations in R-index values can be used as a proxy 
for the likely costs of PRSO. 
  
Prior to correlating utilization rates  with preference 
margins and R
iu
i values, note that  rates vary greatly across 
broad categories of products in both NAFTA and ACP regimes. 
Since the decision to export is taken at the firm level, if 
data were collected at the firm level, we would only have 
utilization rates of zero and one. In fact the utilization 
rate is observed at the HS-6 product level, so the process of 
aggregating zero-one firm decisions will produce  rates in 
the zero-one range at the HS-6 level. Thus the distribution 
reflects firm heterogeneity which can be due to a host of 
factors like different products, different administrative 
compliance costs, or contract prices differing across 
shipments. 
iu
iu
 
Furthermore, recall that utilization rates show the proportion 
of exports to the Northern partner having requested those 
preferences. As with calculations of average tariffs, this 
will not capture the impact of prohibitive RoO, i.e. cases 
where the Southern partner exporters cannot satisfy the rule 
and hence there are zero exports of the product. Thus high 
utilization may in some instances reflect very restrictive 
rules of origin. Comparing the product structure of exports 
under PANEURO and NAFTA rates in table 4, one might be tempted 
to conclude that the higher utilization rates for NAFTA 
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reflect more stringent RoO.12 This observation also suggests 
caution in interpreting the econometric results that follow.  
Finally, note the bunching of  values around zero and one 
values, the bunching being more pronounced for PANEURO than 
for NAFTA. The bunching is particularly pronounced for PANEURO 
final products where only about 18% of the utilization values 
outside the zero and one values. Hence, one can expect it to 
be difficult to correlate utilization rates with R-index 
values.  
iu
 
Insert table 4 here: Distribution of utilization rates and 
preference rates 
 
With these caveats in mind, assume then that utilization rates 
at the tariff-line level, , depend linearly on the tariff 
preference rates,
iu
iτ , and on the index of restrictiveness, iR , 
according to the following linear model: 
 
 i i i kku R D iλ ατ θ ε= + + + +∑  (0.2) 
 
where i  is an index indicating data at the tariff line level 
and  is a set of dummies (either country dummies or dummies 
for stage of processing). The expected signs of the 
coefficients of interest in (0.2)are: .   
k
D
ˆˆ 0, 0α θ> <
 
In (0.2) it is assumed that iτ  and  are exogenous. For 
preferential rates, this is plausible. However the index is 
constructed from the PSRO which are negotiated knowing the 
preference margin. So there is a potential multicollinearity  
iR
                     
12 Trefler (1993) estimated this bias in the case of import volumes and 
tariffs and NTBs and found that the estimated elasticity of import demand 
to NTBs was ten times higher when it the endogeneity of NTBs to imports was 
taken into account.   
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between iτ  and  in (0.2).iR 13 Finally, because of censoring 
values, estimation is carried out with a double-censored Tobit 
estimation procedure. Results are reported in table 5.  
 
Insert table 5 here: Correlates of utilization rates  
 
The first four columns of table 5 report the results from 
estimating(0.2) for NAFTA. For all estimates, the coefficients 
have the expected signs and are significant at the 1% level. 
The remaining columns report the results for PANEURO. The same 
expected sign pattern emerges here as well, with the 
preference coefficient values generally higher than for NAFTA 
and the ROO coefficient values generally smaller. Not 
surprisingly, the results for the final goods sector are less 
significant because of the bunching of observations around 
utilization rate values of zero and one (col. 7). Adding 
country dummies does not alter coefficient values, though it 
improves slightly the estimates for the final good sample 
(col. 10). Adding a dummy for LDCs indicates that a higher 
utilization rate for that group of countries, which one would 
expect since non-LDCs face have less preferential access.14 
Finally, as expected, using trade weights (compare cols. 2 and 
1 and cols. 5 and 6) lowers the estimated coefficient values.  
 
In view of the above encouraging results, we feel justified to 
use values of the R-index to carry out a non-parametric 
                     
13 An endogeneity problem would also arise if a second equation explaining 
iR  as a function of iτ  and another (omitted) variable influenced the 
endogenous variable, . Unfortunately, we do not have a good instrument at 
our disposal, and in any case instrumenting would be difficult if it were 
to take place over the PRSO variables which all take zero-one values except 
for VC. In reality, PSRO are probably negotiated simultaneously with the 
speed of phase-in (at least this is the negotiation process described for 
NAFTA by Estevadeordal (2000), and there is also a more limited phase-in 
for EBA). 
iu
14 Simple [trade-weighted] average MFN tariffs for LDCs are 4.2% [5.0%] and 
for non-LDCs 15.5%, [5.4%] while GSP (EBA) tariffs are 0% for LDCs while 
for non-LDCs ACP tariffs are 0% [0.2%] and GSP tariffs are 6.9% [2.7%].  
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estimation of upper and lower bound estimates following 
inspiration from early work by Herin (1986) for NAFTA. As in 
Anson et al. (forthcoming) where a similar exercise was 
carried out for NAFTA using Estevadeordal’s (2000) R-index, we 
carry out non-parametric compliance cost estimates.  
 
By revealed preference, for headings with 100%iu = , the average 
preference margin, iτ , is an upper-bound, , for compliance 
costs (as  cannot be greater than the benefit conferred by 
Uc
ic
iτ ). Likewise, for headings with 0%iu = , the preference margin 
gives a lower-bound estimate, Lc . For the remaining sectors 
with , assumptions must be made. One could argue 
that, heterogeneity of firms notwithstanding, firms would be 
indifferent to exporting under the preferential regime. Then, 
an approximation of compliance costs would be given by the 
average rate of tariff preference computed for the remaining 
sectors, i.e. on the sample 
0% 100%iu< <
0% 100%iu< < . Applying this 
reasoning, we obtain the estimates in rows 1-3 in table 6 
(unweighted estimates in parenthesis).  
 
The R-index can then be used to breakdown the administrative 
cost component in total compliance costs. Let total compliance 
costs  be given by: ic
 
 i ic iδ σ= +  (0.3) 
where iδ  is the administrative component and iσ  is the 
distortionary component and all variables are expressed as a 
percentage of unit price.  Assume that administrative costs 
would be negligible for firms on their participation 
constraint, i.e. for (0% 100%iu< < ), provided that firms would 
also be confronted with low values of  , i.e. values ir
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corresponding to a change of tariff classification at the 
subheading level, CS. This corresponds to 2≤ir  (not much 
paperwork is involved in "proving" a change of subheading). 
Hence, calculating preference margins for utilization rates 
close to 100% (say  or 95%iu = 90%iu =  to be on the safe side 
when ), gives an upper bound of the distortionary 
component, 
2≤ir
iσ . These estimates are given in row 7. 
 
Insert table 6 here: Estimates of Compliance Costs of Rules of 
Origin  
 
 
The rather large differences between the PANEURO and NAFTA 
estimates, especially when using unweighted data, suggest 
caution in interpreting these estimates since too much weight 
is probably given to outlier observations with small trade 
volumes. 
 
Nonetheless, the higher estimates for the EU are coherent with 
likely higher administrative costs associated with 
certification. PANEURO relies on a two-step private and public 
certification method which is stricter that certification 
under NAFTA where it is single-step private certification that 
need not be carried out each time (see Estevadeordal and 
Suominen (forthcoming, tables 5 and 6).  
 
Further caution is also warranted by an examination of the 
pattern of preferences requested under PANEURO.15 Indeed, if 
                     
15 Based on the same data, Cadot, de Melo and Tumurchudur (2005, table 3.10) 
estimate that the 4 non-LDCs in the group of 16 ACP countries of East and 
South Africa lost about 16% of a total value of preferences estimated at 
€201 million by requesting the less favorable trade regime (usually MFN 
instead of ACP) but occasionally GSP instead of ACP. The former choice 
which accounts for the bulk of losses could be attributable to compliance 
costs, but the latter could reflect also ignorance or recording mistakes. 
Interestingly, for the 12 LDCs in the group who had an estimated value of 
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there are costs in proving origin, then one should not observe 
exporters requesting preferences when there are no 
preferences, yet at the HS-6 digit level there were 4% of the 
tariff lines with such requests. Neither should one observe 
requests for preferential status when preferential margins are 
low, here assumed to be 3%iτ = .16 Yet, according to the bottom 
row of table 6, there were 10% of tariff lines. At best, the 
data are only broadly consistent with the estimated values 
reported here.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has compared the product-specific rules of origin 
(PSRO) that are used in the two best-known North-South FTAs: 
NAFTA and the PANEURO system single-list used by the EU in all 
its FTAs. Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal (2000), we 
use an observation rule to build a restrictiveness index 
intended to capture the complexity of PSRO across tariff 
lines. Much like the effective rate of protection is intended 
as a single measure of the complexity of a tariff regime, the 
resulting R-index purports to fill the same role in a much 
more limited way (because of the inherent difficulties in 
assessing the restrictiveness of varied and complex measures) 
in the case of PSRO. 
 
Higher values of the constructed synthetic ordinal R-index at 
the tariff line level correspond to PSRO perceived to be more 
restrictive. Higher (lower) R-index values are found in 
sectors with tariff peaks (low tariff sectors) this reflecting 
widely perceived characteristics of PRSO, namely that they are 
                                                                
preferences of €95 million lost less than 0.01% from requesting the less 
favorable regime. 
16 Using threshold estimation techniques, Manchin (2004) estimates for the 
same data that preferential status is not asked when 3 4%iτ −<  
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tailor-made to fit the protectionist interests of lobby groups 
in the Northern partner. Regressions of utilization rates of 
preferences at the product line level for PANEURO an NAFTA 
also show that, after controlling for the effect of 
preferential access on utilization rates, sectors with higher 
R-index values have lower utilization rates. 
 
Two applications follow. First, the index is used to study the 
pattern of PSRO across activities and countries. A progression 
of the restrictiveness of PSRO is observed as one moves down 
the sectoral classification to activities with higher 
processing (and hence higher tariffs in the countries granting 
market access via preferences). Non-LDCs and LDCs who will 
jointly negotiate EPAs with the EU are also shown to be 
affected differently because of the commodity composition of 
their exports to the EU, and non-LDCs face the most 
restrictive PSRO in sectors in which they have a revealed 
comparative advantage (in the sense of high export volumes). 
 
Second, revealed preference calculations on utilization rates 
combined with the R-index are used to estimate the overall 
restrictiveness of the two regimes yielding trade-weighted 
compliance [administrative] cost estimates of approximately 
8.0% [6.8%] for PANEURO and 6.8% [1.9%] for NAFTA. While these 
estimates should be interpreted with caution for reasons 
discussed in the text, the higher administrative costs for 
PANEURO are consistent with the more cumbersome procedures 
required for certification in the EU-based agreements.        
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Tables and figures to 
 
Product Specific Rules of Origin in EU and US Preferential 
Trading Arrangements: An Assessment  
 
Table 1  
Regime-Wide RoO in NAFTA and EU’s GSP and Cotonou Agreements 
 
PTA De minimis or 
tolerance 
rule 
Absorption 
(roll up) 
Cumulation Drawback 
allowed 
Certification 
method 
NAFTA 7(except agr. 
& ind. prod; 
7% of weight 
in chs 50-63) 
Yes 
(except 
autos) 
Bilateral No after 7 
yrs 
(S-C) 
US-Chile 10(except in 
agr. & 
processed 
agr. prod) 
Yes Bilateral Not 
mentioned 
(S-C) 
US-GSP 10 (10% of 
weight in chs 
50-63) 
Not 
mentioned 
Bilateral, 
limited 
diagonal 
Not 
mentioned 
(S-C) 
Cotonou 
Agreement  
15% Yes Full  Not 
mentioned 
T-S (PP);  
(L S-C) 
10% EU GSP  
(excepted 
chps 50-63)a
Yes Bilateral, 
limited 
diagonal 
Not 
mentioned 
T-S (PP);  
(L S-C) 
 
 
Source: EU GSP and Cotonou Agreements text; Estevadeordal and Suominen 
(forthcoming) for NAFTA. 
Notes: a/ Chapters 50-63 (textiles & apparel) do not benefit from a de 
minimis provision. 
T-S (PP) = Two-step private and public;(L S-C) = limited self-certification 
(S-C)= self-certification. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of PSRO under NAFTA and PANEURO  
 
% of 
tariff 
lines 
“No other 
requirement” 
or 
“EXC” 
“TECH” 
or  
“TECH+EXC” 
“VC” 
or 
“VC+EXC” 
“TECH+VC” 
or 
“TECH+VC+EX
C” 
“Wholly 
obt'd” 
Other 
addit. 
Requir. 
SUBTOTAL 
 NAFTA PAN NAFTA PAN NAFTA PAN NAFTA PAN NAFTA PAN 
NAFT
A PAN NAFTA PAN 
No CTC 0.54 0.59 0.0 2.59 0.0 12.98 0.0 0.20 0.0 8.10 0.0 7.02 0.54 31.47
CI 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.0 
CS 3.81 0.11 0.44 0.04 0.1 0.38 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.36 4.35 0.95
CH 36.27 16.50 0.16 7.76 4.12 12.78 0.1 0.07 0.0 0.29 0.0 13.87 40.65 51.26
CC 48.66 0.0 5.78 7.31 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.21 54.44 7.67
Altern.            8.65 0.0 8.65
Total 89.3 17.19 6.38 17.69 4.24 26.13 0.1 0.41 0.0 8.45 0.0 30.12 100 100 
 
CTC = change in tariff classification with CC = Change in Chapter / CH = 
Change in Heading / CS  = Change in Subheading / CI = Change in Item; 
EXC = Exception to change of tariff classification;  
VC = Regional Value Content; 
TECH = Technical Requirement. 
Note: Each cell is the percentage of tariff lines that have the ROO in the 
corresponding row and in the corresponding column. 
 
 
Table 3 
 PSRO Restrictiveness Index and Protection  
 
Index valuea,b  
  NAFTA PANEURO 
Tariff peaksc 6.2(257) 4.20(3595) 
Low tariffsd 4.8(1432) 3.41(6092) 
Total number of 
tariff lines 3555 19720 
 
Notes: 
Number of tariff lines in parenthesis. Only tariff lines with positive 
exports (after excluding the outliers)are considered. 
aAll values are trade weighted averages 
bOutlier tariff preferences excluded for NAFTA and PANEURO 
cAll tariff lines that exceed 3 times the average tariff level 
dAll tariff lines that are less than one third of the average tariff 
Source: Authors calculations 
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Figure 1:  
Distribution of R-index 
 
Figure 1a : NAFTA 
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Figure 2: 
ACP average PANEURO R-index: LDCs vs. non-LDCs 
 
Figure 2a : Unweighted averages 
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Figure 2b: Trade-weighted averages 
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Figure 3:  
Preferences and ROO Across EU PTAs 
 
Figure 3a : PANEURO 
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Figure 3a : NAFTA 
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Table 4:  
Distribution of utilization rates and preference rates 
 
Utilization rates ( ) iu
 EU PANEURO NAFTA 
All sectors Ri 4.3 Ri 5.46 
0iu =  59.3% 32.4% 
0 1iu< <  20.8% 41.4% 
1iu =  19.9% 26.3% 
Intermediates Ri 3.82 Ri 5.98 
0iu =  48.7% 20.1% 
0 1iu< <  24.1% 30.7% 
1iu =  27.2% 49.1% 
Final goods Ri 4.79 Ri 5.12 
0iu =  65.4% 34.2% 
0 1iu< <  18% 50% 
1iu =  16.6% 15.9% 
Preference rates ( iτ ): Quartile distribution 
All sectors 4.21% 4.11% 
Quartile 1 (25%:0.0)  (25%:0.0)  
Quartile 2  (50%:2.7%) (50%:2.6%) 
Quartile 3 (75%:6.5%) (75%:5.5%) 
Intermediates 4.42% 4.81% 
Quartile 1 (25%:0.9%)  (25%:0.6%)  
Quartile 2 (50%:4.8%) (50%:3.7%) 
Quartile 3 (75%:7.2%) (75%:7.4%) 
Final goods 4.2% 4.13% 
Quartile 1 (25%:1.1%)  (25%:0.0)  
Quartile 2 (50%:2.7%) (50%:2.5%) 
Quartile 3 (75%:5.95%) (75%:5.0%) 
 
 
Notes: 
Data for NAFTA are for 2001 and data for PANEURO for 2002. Unweighted data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
Table 5:  
Correlates of Utilization rates( ) iu
 
NAFTA   EU ACP 
(1)          (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constant -0.39 0.06 
(5.2)† (1.6) 
-0.25 
(3.3)†
-0.08 
(0.37) 
-0.56 
(10.9)†
0.51 
(27.95)†
-1.30 
(15.4)†
-0.24 
(1.76)*
1.55 
(2.31)‡
0.92 
(1.26) 
0.80 
(0.83) 
-0.68 
(12.7) †
Preference( iτ ) 6.20 
(20.5)†
1.77 
(10.3)†
4.31 
(14.1)†
9.17 
(11.7)†
12.2 
(33.5)†
2.51 
(23.98)†
13.5 
(27.9)†
10.6 
(7.26)†
10.8 
(32.3)†
11.8 
(27.5)†
6.83 
(5.04)†
12.1 
(33.4) †
ROO( iR ) -0.125 
(9.0)†
-0.10 
(12.1)†
-0.25 
(3.31)†
-0.09 
(2.59)†
-0.12 
(11.8)†
-0.04 
(11.02)†
-0.02 
(1.52) 
-0.08 
(2.67)†
-0.13 
(13.7)†
-0.05 
(3.72)†
-0.02 
(0.90) 
-0.11 
(11.6) †
LDC dummy             0.34
(9.9) †
All product             Y Y Y Y Y Y
Final             Y Y Y
Intermediate             Y Y Y
Country dum             Y Y Y Y
Trade weighted             Y Y
# obs 3555 3555 2176        1048 14012 14012 10665 1906 14012 10665 1906 14012
Log likelihood -3552.6            -5033.5 -2121.1 -967.8 -12767.2 -14493.8 -8977.4 -1976.8 -11776.1 -8016.0 -1794.32 -12717.3
 
 
Notes: 
† = Significance at 1% level; ‡ = Significance at 5% level; *= Significance at 10% level; 
Y= Yes, corresponding dummy variable included.  
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Table 6:  
Compliance Cost Estimates 
(percentages) 
 
  PANEURO NAFTA 
 Row Average iτ  Average iτ  
  Total Compliance Costs (c) 
0iu =  1 4.3(4.7)L ic τ= =  0.2(0.3)L ic τ= =  
0 iu< <1 2 8.0 (7.2)ic τ= =  6.8 (6.2)ic τ= =  
1iu =  3 10.2 (8.2)U ic τ= =  7.6 (7.1)U ic τ= =  
  Distortionary cost (σ) 
2iR ≤  & 
 95%iu ≥
5 0.9 (3.8)Uσ τ= =  4.9 (4.4)Uσ τ= =  
2iR ≤  & 
 90%iu ≥
6 1.2 (3.9)Uσ τ= =  4.9 (4.3)Uσ τ= =  
  Administrative cost estimate (δ) 
 7 8.0 0.9 7.1(3.4)
8.0 1.2 6.8 (3.3)
U
U
c
c
δ σ
δ σ
= − = − =
= − = − =
 6.8 4.9 1.9 (1.8)
6.8 4.9 1.9 (1.9)
U
U
c
c
δ σ
δ σ
= − = − =
= − = − =
0iτ =  & 
Requestc
8 # 691 linesa  # 1089 linesb
3%iτ ≤  & 
Requestc
9 # 2173 linesa # 1972 linesb
 
  Notes: Trade weighted estimates appear first followed by corresponding 
unweighted averages in parenthesis 
 
a Total number of tariff lines (at HS-6 digit): 19720 
b Total number of tariff lines (at HS-6 digit): 3555 
c  Only for PANEURO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex to 
Product Specific Rules of Origin in EU and US Preferential 
Trading Arrangements: An Assessment 
 
This annex describes the construction of the restrictiveness 
index and compares it to an earlier index constructed by 
Estevadeordal and Suominen (ES) (2003). EU ROO are defined 
at the HS-4 digit, however the fact that EU ROO were given 
at the more detailed HS 6 digit level, we have constructed 
our index at the HS 6 digit level that corresponds to the 
5595 tariff lines (see table A1). This also facilitates 
comparisons with NAFTA’s ROOs which are defined at the HS-6 
level.  
 
Let ∆CC stand for a change of chapter, ∆CH for a change of 
heading, ∆CS for a change of subheading, and ∆CI for a 
change of item. Like Estevadeordal’s index, our index is 
based on the following classification convention for Change 
of Tariff Classification (CTC) criteria: 
 
∆CC > ∆CH > ∆CS > ∆CI. 
 
Therefore, as far as the CTC is concerned, we follow the 
above ES’s assumptions in the construction of our 
observation rule (see details in table A1).   
 
In both EU SL and NAFTA, in most cases, a CTC criteria is 
always accompanied by one or two (in a few cases even 3) of 
the other requirements such as Value Content, Technical 
Requirement, Exception, Wholly obtained, Allowance and 
NONOR. 
   
According to ES’s assumptions a value of 2 is assigned to a 
Change of Subheading, 4 to a Change of Heading and 6 to a 
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Change of Chapter. Therefore the observation rule assigns 
higher values to the index resulting from the CTC when these 
other requirements are added (and assigns a lower value in 
the case of allowance being followed after the CTC 
criteria).  
 
For instance, from table A1, a change of Heading -∆CH takes 
a value of 4, but the value increases to a 5 when ∆CH is 
accompanied by R1(Wholly obtained criteria) or R2(either one 
of ∆CS, Technical Requirement and Exception). Conversely, it 
takes a lower value of 3 when it is accompanied by an 
Allowance Requirement.  
 
In the case of a Value Content requirement we have taken a 
different approach from ES since in our case the requirement  
varies between 50% and 85%. Thus we use a cut-off point of 
60% originating, and we assign a value of 4 to a VC strictly 
smaller than 60% (VC1), and of 5 to a VC higher than or 
equal to 60% (VC2). 
 
Therefore whenever a VC is combined with other requirements 
(including a CTC) the assigned value will depend on whether 
the percentage of VC is higher or lower compared to the cut-
off point of 60%. (See details in table A1.) 
 
Allowances are treated as mitigating factors that make the 
index jump down one level. In several cases, however, 
allowances are given along with certain restrictions such as 
adding a Value Content restriction (AllowVC). 
  
Exceptions are treated as aggravating factors making the 
index jump up one level. Exceptions as a stand alone are 
assigned a value of 2. 
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In a few instances (8.8% of tariff lines), EU PSRO allow for 
a choice between alternative composite rules to determine a 
product’s origin. For each alternative, we computed a value 
for the R-index and we assigned the lowest index value for 
that line, since in principle the exporter, not customs, 
chooses which rule applies. We therefore assign the index 
value of the least stringent of the two rules.  
 
Another alternative for exporters is between a VC rule and a 
composite alternative. This option was available for 29.4% 
of the tariff lines. Again, we assigned the lowest index 
value to the corresponding tariff lines. 
 
The largest differences between our index and ES’s index 
come from the different approaches to the “wholly produced” 
(WH). Index values are different mostly for two reasons. 
First, because of the importance of agricultural goods in 
ESA exports, the overall value for our index is lower than 
ES’s. Second, we have tried to take into account the choices 
facing exporters, and have consequently assigned the lowest 
possible value for the index when several options were 
available.  
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Table A1 The Observation Rule to construct the R index 
r=1 (R1) if   
y*=NC 
 y*=WH 
 y*=R2+allow (*) 
 
r=2  (R2) if     
y*=∆CS   
  y*=TECH   
y*=EXC 
y*=R1+R2 
   
r=3  if     
y*=R2+R2   
y*=∆CH +allow (*) 
    
r=4  if     
y*=∆CH  
y*=VC1 
y*=VC1+Oth.Req 
     y*=∆CH+R2+allow (*)  
 
r=5  if   
y*=VC2  
y*=VC2+Oth.Req 
y*=VC1+R1 (orR2) 
y*=∆CH +R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CH +R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CH +VC1 
y*=∆CH +VC1+R1 (or R2) +allow (*)  
 
r=6 if      
y*=∆CC or 
y*=VC2+R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CH +VC2 
y*=∆CH +VC2+R1 +allow (*) 
y*=∆CH +VC1+R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CH +VC1+ R1 (or R2) +R1(or R2) 
y*=VC1+R1 (or R2) +R1 (or R2) 
 
 r=7  if    
y*=VC2+ R1 (or R2) +R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CH +VC2+R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CH +VC2+ R1 (or R2) +R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CC +R1 (or R2) 
y*=∆CC +VC 
y*=∆CC +R1 (or R2)+ R1(or R2) 
y*=∆CC +VC+R1 (or R2)+ R1(or R2) 
Note: y* is the latent variable approximated by the observation rule and assignment to the 
corresponding R value on the left-hand side column; (*) only applies for EU ROO; VC1 if 
VC>40, VC2 if  VC <=40; Oth.Requirement are NONOR, VC-R;   
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